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Abstract 
After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III 
framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement 
the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that 
is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced 
a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” 
to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks 
Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet 
the prominent role played by relatively new contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in the 
Swiss Finish, coupled with the fact that banks are allowed to use their own internal models 
in determining whether requirements are met may call into question the extent to which the 
Swiss Finish to Basel III represents a meaningful enhancement to the risk-based capital 
requirements of the Basel framework. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
1 This module is one of seven produced by the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) examining issues 
related to Basel III. The other modules in this series are: 
• Basel III A: Regulatory History  
• Basel III B: Basel III Overview. 
• Basel III C: Internal Risk Models  
• Basel III E: Synthetic Financing by Prime Brokers  
• Basel III F: Callable Commercial Paper 
• Basel III G: Shadow Banking and Project Finance 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises. 
2  Director, New Bagehot Project and Senior Editor, Case Study and Research, YPFS, Yale School of 
Management.  
3 Economist, Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt/Main Financial Stability Department and Research 
Department. This co-author’s contribution represents her personal opinions and does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.  
4  Janet L. Yellen Professor of Finance and Management, and YPFS Program Director, Yale School of 
Management. 
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In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory 
standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. Having identified three factors as 
playing a crucial role in fueling the crisis (capital, liquidity, and interconnectedness), the 
BCBS introduced the Basel III framework in 2010 to address these issues. Under Basel III, 
banks would be required to improve both the quantity and quality of their capital based on 
the extent of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). They also would be required to meet new 
liquidity standards. Those banks deemed most important from a systemic standpoint would 
be subject to further requirements.  
When the Basel III standards were promulgated by the BCBS, individual countries 
confronted the question of how best to implement them given their unique national 
circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and 
very large relative to the size of its overall economy, arguably faced a special challenge. It 
ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—
enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and 
UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. 
Yet a significant portion of the enhanced requirements of the Swiss Finish can be satisfied 
using relatively new contingent convertible capital (CoCos). The fact that the loss-
absorbency capacity of such hybrid debt instruments has not been tested during a financial 
crisis means that it is not clear the enhanced capital requirements of the Swiss Finish will 
prove sufficiently protective. Furthermore, because the risk-based capital requirements of 
Basel III and the Swiss Finish are based on the calculation of individual banks’ RWA and 
banks are allowed to use their own internal models in calculating RWA, there is some 
concern that the requirements can be met through more aggressive modeling rather than 
actual reductions in risk or increases in capital. Indeed, while both Credit Suisse and UBS 
have reported sharp drops in RWA since the introduction of Basel III and the Swiss Finish, 
some wonder to what extent these drops are genuine. This issue raises important questions 
about whether allowing banks to rely on internal models for calculating RWA leaves such 
calculations open to manipulation that could ultimately undercut the risk-based approach to 
capital requirements adopted by Basel III. 
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of Basel 
III. Section 3 discusses the Swiss implementation of Basel III, focusing specifically on the 
Swiss Finish. Section 4 discusses the calculation of RWA using internal risk models. Section 
5 evaluates how Credit Suisse and UBS have responded to the Swiss Finish. 
Questions 
1. Is the calculation of RWA using banks’ internal risk models subject to manipulation 
and, if so, how can this manipulation be addressed? 
2. Does the Swiss Finish to Basel III represent a meaningful enhancement to the risk-
based capital requirements of the Basel framework in light of concerns about 
manipulation? 
3. Is the prominent role of contingent convertible capital (CoCos) in the Swiss Finish to 
Basel III problematic? 
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2. Overview of Basel III 
Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address three of the critical 
factors the BCBS has identified as contributing to the financial crisis: 
1. That troubled banks held an inadequate amount of capital and that the capital they 
did hold was of an insufficient quality (Capital Reform) 
2. That even adequately capitalized banks experienced difficulties due to insufficient 
liquidity (Liquidity Standards) 
3. That the interconnectedness of financial institutions transmitted shocks across the 
financial system and the broader economy (Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness)  
Capital Reform: Under Basel III, banks must improve both the quantity and quality of their 
capital. The minimum ratio of common equity to RWA has been increased from 2% to 4.5%, 
with total capital required to represent at least 8% of RWA. A capital conservation buffer of 
2.5% and a countercyclical buffer of between 0% and 2.5% have also been introduced. 
Additionally, Basel III establishes a leverage ratio requiring banks to maintain Tier 1 capital 
that is at least 3% of total exposure. 
Liquidity Standards: Basel III introduces two new liquidity measurements. Under the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, banks must maintain a sufficient quantity of high-quality liquid 
assets to cover expected outflows in a 30-day stressed funding scenario. The Net Stable 
Funding Ratio, on the other hand, compares available funding sources with the funding 
needs associated with the banks’ assets and exposures over a one-year period. 
Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness: Basel III includes several measures aimed at 
addressing the threat of contagion given the interconnectedness that exists in the financial 
markets. Higher capital requirements have been given to systemic derivatives and inter-
financial exposures, and a capital surcharge of 1% to 2.5% in common equity has been 
introduced for banks deemed systemically important. (For a more detailed discussion of 
Basel III, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al. 2014B.)  
3. The Swiss Implementation of Basel III 
Risk-Based Capital 
Basel III’s requirements are being phased in over time, with a targeted completion date of 
2019 and interim deadlines along the way. Different countries have made varying degrees of 
progress in implementing Basel III. In Switzerland, the implementation of Basel III began 
with an amendment to the country’s Capital Adequacy Ordinance (CAO) effective January 1, 
2013. Under the CAO as amended, Swiss banks must meet the minimum risk-based capital 
standards established by Basel III—total capital equal to 8.0% of RWA, with a minimum of 
4.5% held in the form of Common Equity Tier 1 and a minimum of 6.0% held in the form of 
Tier 1 Capital. Additionally, consistent with the requirements of Basel III, the CAO 
established a 2.5% capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer of up to 2.5%, 
each to be met with Common Equity Tier 1. The CAO also empowered the Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) to require additional capital. (To review the basic 
risk-based capital requirements established by the Swiss, see pages 14 and 15 of CAO 2012.) 
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While the risk-based capital requirements outlined above apply to Swiss banks generally, 
the Swiss banking industry represents an extreme example of consolidation and magnitude 
relative to the size of the host economy. Switzerland’s two largest banks— Credit Suisse and 
UBS— account for nearly 40% of the domestic credit market and have combined total assets 
over four times the size of the nation’s gross domestic product (Financial Stability Board 
2012, 9). 
Figure 1: Total Assets of the Banking Sector to GDP (year-end 2010) 
 
Source: Financial Stability Board 2012, 9. 
 
Given how critical Credit Suisse and UBS are to both the Swiss banking industry and its 
overall economy, difficulties the institutions faced during the financial crisis highlighted the 
need to strengthen their resiliency. UBS in particular, which had substantial exposure to the 
U.S. subprime market as the crisis began, incurred significant losses, ultimately resulting in 
the creation of a stabilization fund by Swiss authorities in October 2008 to absorb up to $60 
billion in illiquid assets from the bank’s balance sheet. 
In response to the lessons of the financial crisis, the Swiss adopted a “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) 
package intended to reduce the need for future government intervention (sometimes known 
as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III). Under the TBTF approach, banks deemed systemically 
important (initially only Credit Suisse and UBS, but now including two additional Swiss 
banks) must, in addition to meeting the 4.5% minimum Common Equity Tier 1 ratio 
applicable to all banks, maintain a capital buffer of 8.5% of RWA comprised of Common 
Equity Tier 1 and up to 3% of contingent convertible capital (CoCos) that is triggered when 
eligible Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 7% of RWA (commonly referred to as Recovery 
CoCos). Furthermore, systemically important banks must maintain a progressive component 
ranging from 1% to approximately 6% of RWA based on a progression rate set annually by 
FINMA and tied to size and market share. This progressive component can be satisfied with 
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CoCos that are triggered once eligible Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 5% (commonly 
referred to as Resolution CoCos). (See Figure 2 for detail.) 
Significantly, while the total risk-based capital requirement for a systemically important 
Swiss bank can reach upwards of approximately 19% of RWA, only 10% of RWA must be in 
the form of Common Equity Tier 1. The remainder can come from CoCos, hybrid debt 
instruments that can absorb bank losses by converting to equity or otherwise being reduced 
in principal upon the occurrence of a contractually specified trigger (in the case of the Swiss 
Finish, when Common Equity Tier 1 falls below 7% of RWA and below 5% of RWA). Triggers 
are typically set so that when they are reached by an issuer, it is an indicator that the issuer 
is in financial distress and may have difficulty raising needed additional capital from the 
markets. The equity conversion or principal reduction that automatically occurs once the 
trigger is reached provides this needed additional capital. As a result, CoCos are seen by 
many regulators as an acceptable means of satisfying capital requirements. Under the Basel 
III framework itself, for instance, CoCos can qualify as Additional Tier 1 Capital or Tier 2 
Capital depending upon their trigger levels (low-trigger CoCos are less able to absorb losses 
and are therefore classified as Tier 2 Capital, while high-trigger CoCos absorb more losses 
and are classified as Additional Tier 1 Capital) (Avdjiev et al 2013). The prominent role given 
to CoCos in the Swiss Finish may have led Swiss banks to become the second largest issuer 
of CoCos in the world since 2009. (See Figure 3.) 
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Figure 3: Total CoCos since 2009 by Issuing Country (US$ Billions) 
 
Source: Avdjiev et al 2013. 
 
Yet the emergence of CoCos is a relatively new phenomenon, and the financial instrument’s 
capacity for absorbing losses has not yet been tested in the context of a financial crisis. For 
example, triggers based on Common Equity Tier 1 can only be activated as quickly and as 
frequently as this value can be officially calculated and publicly disclosed, which may only be 
quarterly. In a fast-moving financial crisis, this activation may not occur in time. Thus, it is 
not entirely clear how protective the enhanced capital requirements of the Swiss Finish 
would be given the heavy reliance on CoCos.  (To review the risk-based capital requirements 
of the Swiss TBTF approach, see pages 35 through 38 of CAO 2013.) 
Leverage Ratio 
In addition to the risk-based capital requirements outlined above, the Swiss implementation 
of Basel III also includes a non-risk-based leverage ratio for systemically important banks. 
Rather than establishing a fixed minimum ratio, however, the Swiss approach sets the 
required leverage ratio at 24% of the specific risk-based capital requirements applicable to 
a particular bank. Thus, a hypothetical systemically important bank with a 4.5% minimum 
capital requirement, 8.5% capital buffer and 3% progressive component would have a 
minimum required leverage ratio of 3.8% of “total commitment” ([4.5% + 8.5% + 3%] * .24). 
(To review the leverage ratio requirements of the Swiss TBTF approach, see pages 38 and 
39 of CAO 2012.) 
4. The Calculation of Risk-Weighted Assets 
The risk-based capital requirements associated with the Basel III regime necessitate the 
calculation of RWA for each financial institution subject to the requirements. Under the Basel 
III framework, this calculation is performed based on three distinct categories of risk: 
• Credit Risk—risk stemming from a borrower or other counterparty not making 
payments as required 
• Market Risk—risk stemming from movements in market prices 
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• Operational Risk—risk stemming from inadequate or failed internal processes, 
people and systems or from external events 
For each category of risk, Basel II established multiple calculation methodologies from which 
financial institutions may choose (subject in some instances to regulatory approval) that are 
still in use under Basel III. For instance, in determining Credit Risk, banks may use a 
Standardized Approach based on standardized risk weights established by Basel for various 
categories of assets. Banks’ task under the Standardized Approach is to determine into which 
risk-weight buckets each of their assets should be placed. As an example, corporate debt that 
has been rated is assigned a risk weight from 20% (for AAA to AA- minus debt) to 150% (for 
below BB- debt) (Bank for International Settlements 2006, 23). 
Alternatively, subject to regulatory approval, banks may opt for the Internal Ratings-Based 
Approach to determining Credit Risk. Under the IRB Approach, banks rely on their own 
internal estimates of the risk associated with given assets rather than on standardized risk 
weights. Banks must first categorize their assets by asset class (corporate, sovereign, bank, 
retail, or equity) and then, in general, determine the probability of default (under the 
Foundation IRB Approach, in which regulators determine the other risk components) or the 
probability of default, loss given default, exposure at default, and effective maturity (under 
the Advanced IRB Approach) associated with the assets. 
The other types of risk included in the RWA determination offer similar choices between 
methodologies based on standardized calculations and methodologies in which banks must 
rely on their own internal estimates. Operational Risk can be calculated using the Basic 
Indicator Approach (based on a fixed percentage of gross income), the Standardized 
Approach (based on a fixed percentage of gross income generated by different business 
lines) or the Advanced Measurement Approaches (based on the determinations of a firm’s 
own internal operational risk management system). Similarly, Market Risk can be calculated 
using the Standardized Measurement Method (based on fixed capital charges assigned to 
different types of securities) or the Internal Models Approach (based on determinations of a 
firm’s own internal models). (For a complete discussion of the use of internal risk models, 
see YPFS Case Study Basel III C: Internal Risk Models.) 
Given the potential for manipulation inherent in allowing banks to use their own internal 
estimates in making the RWA calculations that will in turn determine the risk-based capital 
thresholds that they must meet, banks must satisfy a number of requirements in order to use 
the internal approaches. For example, there are a number of separate categories of 
requirements that must be met before banks can use the IRB Approach to calculating credit 
risk, including rating system design, risk rating system operations, corporate governance 
and oversight, and validation of internal estimates. According to the BCBS, the use of the IRB 
Approach to calculating credit risk requires a bank to “demonstrate to its supervisor that it 
meets certain minimum requirements at the outset and on an ongoing basis,” with a focus 
on “banks’ abilities to rank order and quantify risk in a consistent, reliable and valid fashion” 
(Bank for International Settlements 2006, 89). (For a complete description of the different 
categories of risk underlying the RWA calculation and the various methodologies that can be 
used in making the calculation, see pages 19 through 209 of Bank for International 
Settlements 2006.) 
Notwithstanding the requirements established by Basel for using internal estimates for 
calculating RWA, some commentators see the potential for manipulation being realized in a 
way that vitiates the risk-based capital requirements regime. While noting that the 
introduction of methodologies based on internal estimates was done with understandable 
intentions (to reduce incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and create incentives to 
upgrade risk management), Andrew Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability at the 
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Bank of England, has argued that “self-assessment has created incentives to shade reported 
capital ratios” (Haldane 2013, 1). Haldane concludes, “[t]he aggregate evidence is consistent 
with [shading downwards risk weights or switching to lower risk-weight asset categories to 
boost capital ratios] having occurred secularly and on a significant scale” (Ibid., 3). Reported 
reductions in RWA and resulting increases in capital ratios must thus be examined with this 
alternative explanation in mind. 
5. The Response of Credit Suisse and UBS 
With the ostensibly enhanced risk-based capital requirements of the Swiss TBTF approach 
and the consequent added pressure to reduce RWA, an analysis of the responses of Credit 
Suisse and UBS to Basel III and the Swiss Finish in light of concerns about banks “marking 
their own exams” (as Haldane puts it) is worthwhile (2013). In the wake of Basel III and the 
Swiss Finish, both Credit Suisse and UBS announced significant strategic decisions that they 
linked directly to the need to comply with the new regulatory environment. On October 30, 
2012, UBS announced that it would be largely shuttering its fixed income business lines, 
arguing that such business lines “[had] been rendered uneconomical by changes in 
regulation and market forces” and “do not meet their cost of capital sustainably.” In the same 
press release, UBS committed to a more aggressive reduction of RWA than previously 
announced (UBS 2012).  
Credit Suisse, on the other hand, announced in November 2011 that it would maintain its 
fixed income business lines while seeking to cut the associated RWA in half. In its investor 
presentation accompanying the announcement, Credit Suisse noted that a shift to Basel III 
would reduce the company’s return-on-equity (ROE) from 19% to 10% absent a change to 
its business model. By cutting the RWA associated with its fixed-income business lines, 
Credit Suisse hoped to preserve an ROE of 17% (Credit Suisse 2011, 32-37). 
To date, Swiss regulators have not taken a public position on which approach they prefer. 
Mark Branson, Head of Banks for FINMA, has described his body’s role as setting “the 
framework within which each bank has to operate” and then allowing them to “make their 
own strategic choices.” Ultimately, Branson believes, “the markets and clients will make their 
judgment and we will see which model is more successful” (International Service of the Swiss 
Broadcasting Corporation 2012). 
Despite their differing strategies, both Credit Suisse and UBS have had success in 
significantly reducing their RWA. Credit Suisse has cut RWA from CHF$339 billion in 2011 
to CHF$261 billion in 3Q 2013 (Credit Suisse 2013, 29). Similarly, UBS has reduced RWA 
from CHF$301 billion in 3Q 2012 to CHF$219 billion in 3Q 2013 (UBS 2013, 2).   
Yet questions remain about how exactly Credit Suisse and UBS have achieved these 
reductions. Former CEO of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) and Vice-
Chairman of FINMA Daniel Zuberbühler has raised concerns about what he sees as 
inappropriately low risk weights being assigned to certain asset categories by Credit Suisse 
and UBS. He notes, for example, that both Credit Suisse and UBS have assigned residential 
mortgages an average risk weight of approximately 10% in using internal methodologies to 
calculate RWA. This compares with a minimum risk weight of 35% for residential mortgages 
in standardized approaches (Zuberbühler 2013, 108-110).  
Such concerns are seemingly bolstered by data demonstrating that Credit Suisse and UBS 
have a ratio of RWA to total assets (or RWA density) that is significantly lower than the ratio 
of other global systemically important banks (25% vs. 50%). (See Figure 4). Some variation 
88
Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 1 Iss. 4
   
 
 
in RWA density is to be expected based on differences in business models. A recent IMF paper 
identified business models as a key driver in the composition and levels of RWAs, with retail 
banks such as are often found in Spain, Italy, and the U.K. having a higher RWA density than 
banks from Switzerland that are heavily involved in investment banking (Le Lesle and 
Avramova 2012). Still, while differences in business model may explain some of the 
difference in RWA, the size of the gap could suggest that Credit Suisse and UBS are using their 
internal risk models to be more aggressive in determining the risk associated with their 
assets than other major financial institutions. 
Figure 4: Percentage of Risk Weighted Assets to Total Assets (RWA Density) 
 
Source: Bankscope.  
Thus, while the Swiss Finish has been trumpeted in some quarters for its enhanced risk-
based capital requirements, such requirements are only as strong as the methodologies for 
calculating the ratios. Regulations that require banks to maintain a high level of capital 
relative to RWA can be effectively undone if calculations of RWA can be artificially lowered.  
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